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Humour and the Unacceptable in Neil Hamburger’s Routine 
Daniel Derrin, Macquarie University
The ‘sick’ humour of Australian born US comedian Gregg Turkington’s alter-ego, ‘Neil 
Hamburger,’ invites us to ask questions about the meaning of offensive humour as an 
instance of the unacceptable. Hamburger invites us to ‘stop and think,’ in Lockyer and 
Pickering’s phrase (2011: 12), about why we are unable to laugh at some things and 
about whether we ought to or not. How and when humour becomes offensive has 
become an important topic in contemporary humour studies.1 Neil Hamburger’s standup 
routine is an interesting instance of humour that borders on offence not just because of 
the ‘sick’ elements in his jokes but also because of his parody of standup comedy itself. 
It is purposeful but risks the possibility of not being funny. Notwithstanding the context 
of the comedy club—where jokes that push the limit are expected—anyone who gets up 
on an American stage to joke about God not being able to create tits because he is gay is 
likely to risk offence, and of course, the ‘joke’ not being experienced as funny. The 
unseemliness of Hamburger’s stage persona helps him get away with it but Hamburger 
does provoke wildly divergent reactions, from gleeful approval to moral outrage and 
(or) boredom. One reviewer from the Guardian, Brian Logan, described him as a ‘so-
bad-he’s-still-bad anti-comedian’ and stated of a particular performance in Edinburgh 
that ‘if we laugh—and I did—we’re doing so at the intemperance of his hatred, and at 
his assumption that we’ll share it’ (Logan 2010: para. 1, 2). Why does Neil Hamburger 
1 See, for instance: Palmer (1994: 161–172), Billig (2005), Hall & Sereno (2010), Pickering & Lockyer 
(2005), and Davies (2011). 
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tell the kind of jokes that genuinely risk not being funny? What is his purpose in 
deliberately going so close to many bones? In short, how does offence play into his 
politics? 
 
Understanding Hamburger’s purposes and politics offers an important contribution to 
the scholarly discussion of offensive humour because it draws attention to problems 
raised by some recent theories within humour studies, offered as an explanation of what 
happens when humour becomes offensive. The work of Palmer (1994) and Billig (2005) 
in particular offer discussions of the social and subjective thresholds between humour 
and offence. Palmer emphasizes the role of occasion as affecting the social psychology 
of humour. He demonstrates convincingly that occasion can affect whether a joke in a 
given instance becomes established as a joke: for example, bottom-pinching in a pub 
environment can and has been defended as a joke even when ‘one person’s humour 
[wa]s another person’s offensiveness’ (1994: 167–168). The role of occasion is an 
important acknowledgement. The comedy club context of many, though not all, of 
Hamburger’s performances allows him significant license. Despite that, though, he can 
still offend. Furthermore, if occasion has an influence, one might still ask what occasion 
does actually at the psychological level in having that influence. How exactly does a 
pub environment make a person able to justify an act of bottom-pinching as a joke when 
they might not elsewhere? What effect does environment have—emotionally, morally—
on the mind?  
 
Billig’s more recent discussion of humour and laughter as ridicule (2005) helpfully 
reminds us of the extent to which a moral vision underlies most forms of humour. Billig 
analyzes the disciplinary functions of humour and laughter, which reinforce the values 
constituting the social order by exposing contradictions of them to ridicule. Billig 
acknowledges the category of ‘rebellious humour’ (2005: 207–214), which would seem 
to be something else than disciplinary. However, he goes on to point out ways in which 
rebellious humour can be disciplinary too; that is, such humour simply functions to 
support the prevailing social order (2005: 211–212). Another important example is the 
more widely recognized disciplinary function of fools and folly in the Middle Ages.2 To 
some extent Billig’s focus on the disciplinary power of humour and its conservatism 
                                                
2 Billig (2005: 212–213) quotes Zijderveld (1982: 28). See also Ghose (2008: 63–65) on historiographical 
problems to do with Bakhtin’s argument about folly as transgressive.  
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draws on the work of Mulkay who argued influentially that humour’s existence as a 
‘non-serious’ mode of discourse makes it fundamentally derivative of politics in the 
serious realm, and thus ultimately powerless because it cannot intervene independently. 
When humour is powerful, it is because it reflects politics that are already at play in the 
‘serious realm’ (Mulkay 1988: 197–219). However, a derivative or a disciplinary 
account of the ‘power’ of humour leaves little by which to distinguish between 
conservative disciplinary humour that attacks contradictions of the social order’s values 
and humour that is truly rebellious. That is to say, defining humour largely in terms of 
socially disciplinary ridicule or something derivative of serious politics means reducing 
revolutionary humour to the pleasure of rebellion or to impotent fun. And yet, if humour 
is a rhetorical tool, as Billig says (2005: 189), what is it that changes when humorous 
ridicule becomes rebellious as it lights upon a fresh sense of what is at fault in the social 
order, such as when Hamburger invites his audience to see the meaninglessness (from 
his point of view) of the categories of celebrity and the sacred? Shared laughter is a 
social force, but it is also a shared moral vision, and thus a mental phenomenon as much 
as a social one.  
 
Here I want to revisit Aristotle’s comments in the Poetics on the risible in order to bring 
out the psychological elements of humour implicit in those comments; this will be of 
use in analyzing Hamburger’s routine because they point to both the shared moral 
vision in rebellious humour as well as the subjective thresholds beyond which humour 
becomes pain or offence. Aristotle’s comments on the subjects of comedy and the 
risible are usually just put together with those of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1689), as an 
example of ‘superiority theory.’3 However, Aristotelian thinking on the subject can 
evoke more than that. The comments in his Poetics do not amount to a theory of 
comedy, as is well known; the book primarily discussed tragedy. However, in the 
context of a short discussion of theatrical comedy, Aristotle spoke evocatively though 
ambiguously of the laughable as a species of the ugly or disgraceful. The laughable, he 
suggests, is ‘constituted by a fault and a mark of shame (aischros), but lacking in pain 
or destruction’ (1987: 36). For this reason, Aristotle describes the genre of theatrical 
comedy as that which imitates people and behaviours that violate values held to be  
                                                
3 For examples, see Monro (1951: 83) and Morreall (1983: 4–6). In more recent discussions, Critchley 
(2002), Billig (2005: 43–45) and Martin (2007: 44) do not question seriously the ascription of ‘superiority 
theorist’ to Aristotle. 
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normative (1987: 33). Yet while the laughable focuses on a (moral) fault, the emotion of 
humour it generates does not need to be seen as a stance of superiority. The level of 
sympathy that a person experiencing humour has toward the ‘faults’ of others will 
depend, among other things, on the extent to which he or she also shares such a fault. 
Laughing at the mistakes of another does not preclude simultaneous recognition of the 
same mistakes in oneself. Neil Hamburger’s routine, for instance, affects more than just 
an attitude of superiority in the audience towards his ‘ugly’ stage persona, or within that 
persona towards the celebrities he jokes about. Hamburger is capable of developing 
more sympathy for his antics and his attitude to celebrity and the sacred than one would 
expect at first. Though as will become increasingly clear, not everybody ‘gets it.’ 
 
The laughable, for Aristotle, is a particular species of fault/shame/ugliness (aischros) 
and its particular feature is that it does not involve pain or destruction. Yet ‘lacking in 
pain or destruction’ involves a considerable ambiguity. Does Aristotle mean ‘lacking in 
pain or destruction’ for the person being laughed at? That would mean he is prescribing 
a threshold beyond which a person or thing should not be mocked: that is, up to the 
point at which they truly suffer. Or, does Aristotle mean ‘lacking in pain or destruction’ 
for the person laughing? In that case, he is empirically describing a psychological 
threshold in the experience of humour, whereby a given subjectivity cannot experience 
amusement if it hits too close to home, because that is the point at which emotional 
experience moves from humour to horror. We do not need to decide for one over the 
other. As Halliwell’s commentary notes, both interpretations are possible (1987: 85). 
However, I wish to exploit that latter possibility—that there is a subjective threshold 
marking the scope of humour—as a way of engaging with offence and the unacceptable 
at the level of subjectivity, or individual psychological experience. The threshold I am 
interested in is that familiar point of mental recognition, which says: ‘maybe I should 
not be laughing at this.’ It is a question that Hamburger’s performances evoke.  
 
Aristotle’s comments offer us not just the idea that a critical and thus moral or 
evaluative stance lies behind the psychology of the laughable, or the unseemly. They 
suggest also that, because of the critical stance it implies, when people share humour 
they share a specific moral vision, that is to say, a set of beliefs about how things ought 
to be or ought not to be. For there to be an unseemly—free of pain and destruction—
there needs to be a seemly. Christie Davies’s recent book Jokes and Targets discusses 
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lawyer jokes targeting excessive counter-litigation that originate in America but were 
emailed around and enjoyed by British lawyers (2011: 187–188). While Davies focuses 
on the shift between the American joke as a joke about ‘us’ that becomes, in the British 
context, a joke about ‘them,’ about ‘those American lawyers who go in for that sort of 
thing’ (2011: 188), the British lawyers were able to enter into a similar moral vision 
focusing on the ‘unseemliness’ of concatenated counter lawsuits. This is an instance of 
shared moral vision. On the other side of the coin, we might say that when people 
cannot share a joke, and the line is crossed by humour so that it becomes offensive, 
there is a breakdown of shared moral vision because other horizons of moral thinking 
come into play.  
 
The idea that a moral vision is central to sharing humour gives us a way of describing 
the difference between ‘disciplinary’ and ‘rebellious’ humour as more than just the 
social difference between mocking the powerless and mocking the powerful (Billig 
2005: 208). Rebellious humour is not necessarily just that of the humour shared by the 
powerless at the expense of the powerful, although it can be described that way. It is 
better to think of rebellious humour as an alternative moral vision that people can share 
or not share, find funny or not find funny. If humour requires a shared moral vision to 
be successful, then from this point of view, one of the reasons why people struggle with 
whether Hamburger is funny or not is because his jokes move towards a moral vision 
that seeks to disable our tendency to expect celebrity and the sacred to be meaningful 
categories. The ubiquitous mockery of celebrity in popular culture and mockery of the 
sacred assumes the expectation that those categories are meaningful. When celebrities 
do not live up to the behaviour we might expect of public figures and role models, there 
is a laughable unseemliness to be shared. If Hamburger were merely attacking that 
conventional form of unseemliness, such as sexual foibles, conspicuous substance abuse, 
and endless marriages and divorces, and if therefore he were merely supporting 
conventional beliefs about how celebrity lives ought to be better, his ‘humour’ would 
not be the challenge it is, nor would it risk the offence it does.  
 
Of course, this moral antagonism toward the ‘meaningfulness’ of the categories of 
sacred and secular is not a completely unique vision of the world. A great deal of more 
sophisticated comedy is devoted to mocking the pretensions of celebrities who act as if 
their mere celebrity makes them important, thus rendering mere celebrity meaningless. 
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The moral vision underlying this is that celebrities ought to be in touch with the fact that 
celebrity itself is not a significant human achievement. When they are not, their 
behaviour can be very funny when a comedian draws attention to that contradiction. 
Hamburger’s moral vision is in the same ballpark. His means of deconstruction, 
however, is relatively unique. Not only do his sick jokes push the limit of comic 
potential by risking people not even finding the jokes funny, but Hamburger groans at 
his own jokes as if they were bad ones, almost confirming the audience’s confusion. 
The groans implicitly ask the audience to be complicit in the mockery of the joke even 
as it is being told and ‘enjoyed.’ This has the effect not only of evacuating the 
categories of celebrity and sacred of any meaning but also of softening the intensity 
even of the moral vision that questions celebrity-behaviour. This in itself is potentially 
amusing because comedy shows are expected to be funny and Hamburger makes a 
mockery of his own funniness. In doing so he is often very funny.  
 
Aristotle’s comment about humour being a fault that does not cause pain, also suggests, 
as I have said, a subjective (and when shared, social) threshold beyond which humour 
becomes horror, and the merely unseemly becomes the abominable as the comic 
situation or joke cuts too close to the bone. I am therefore using the English word 
‘unseemly’ to describe that which people are able to find funny because the particular 
moral compromise remains, in Aristotle’s words, ‘free from pain and destruction.’ 
Within this Aristotelian framework there is a continuum of moral compromise moving 
away from moral foibles or contradictions of values and expectations that are not 
particularly threatening and are therefore funny and towards that which causes moral 
outrage and vicarious (or otherwise) pain. Any given person will experience a particular 
joke (a joke targeting some form of unseemliness) in a slightly different place on the 
continuum. That relativity describes what happens when some people are offended by a 
joke and others are delighted. Getting too close to the bone means getting too close to 
that less amusing and deeply problematic terrain, which cannot be described as merely 
unseemly anymore and is unlikely to be experienced as funny. For instance, a joke 
about a certain form of sexual unseemliness might evoke in one person painful 
memories that make the joke offensive or not funny and yet be immensely amusing to 
another because the distance from any such memories makes the critique of the joke 
remain merely unseemly. At the level of socially negotiated moral vision, it can be 
unacceptable to laugh at or find certain things merely unseemly and thus amusing, given 
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the sheer gravity of the pain and (or) destruction those topics involve; the holocaust and 
its survivors is an obvious example. Sufficient personal or socially negotiated distance 
has to exist from any kind of confronting horror for things to be laughable. It is 
sometimes difficult to know where the dividing line is. Most of us have been confronted 
with the experience of simultaneously laughing at something and asking ourselves 
whether we really ought to be laughing. Speaking of a subjective and social threshold 
between the unseemly (funny) and the morally abominable (unacceptable) gives us a 
way of understanding what is going on in that confusing scenario.  
 
‘Distance’ from pain or destruction is therefore a key element in an Aristotelian 
psychology of humour. Hamburger carefully stays on the acceptably decorous side of 
the threshold when joking for instance that God invented Domino’s Pizza to punish 
humanity for its complacency in letting the holocaust happen. There he maintains a 
certain distance from the holocaust itself—and from the threshold where things might 
become unacceptable or deeply offensive—by joking only with reference to the 
holocaust and making Domino’s Pizza and his caricature of God the butt, target, or 
unseemly aischros of his intense critical focus. Palmer’s discussion of cruel or sadistic 
humour presents the idea that the SS officer in Sophie’s Choice (Styron 1979) is a kind 
of joke in the context of his own subjectivity (1994: 170–171). The idea of distance 
helps to address how that works. Where anyone else looking on might think of the 
choice he presents to Sophie and its perverse quotation of Christ’s words ‘Suffer little 
children to come unto me’ as unspeakable abomination, the SS officer sees the whole 
situation as merely unseemly for a whole range of reasons. What is different? The 
difference is that the SS officer’s ideological context and its debasement of empathy 
distances him from the suffering and pain that anyone else might feel immediately, even 
with the imagination. Lockyer and Pickering begin their book on the limits of humour 
with Silvio’s Berlusconi’s unfortunate suggestion, when opening his term as president 
of the European Parliament, that German member of the European Parliament, Martin 
Schulz, could play the part of a guard in a film about Nazi concentration camps (2005: 
1). The ‘joke’ was a disaster and Berlusconi defended himself by saying that Italians 
knew how to laugh at these kinds of tragedies. Clearly, Berlusconi assumed a distance 
when there was not one. To return to Palmer’s concern with occasion as it influences the 
psychology of humour (1994: 11–40), I would suggest that part of that influence is the 
way an occasion either distances people from their particular complex of memories that 
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cause pain, sufficiently for jokes to be effective, or otherwise, fails to maintain that 
distance, leading to offence or simply a lack of funniness. The amount of people who 
are able to stay on the lighter side of the threshold between painless unseemliness and 
painful offensiveness will shape the extent to which an occasion is humorous. The 
threshold is negotiated differently for each person but only two people need to share the 
moral vision of a joke and stay on the humorous side of the threshold for humour to be 
said to exist, as distinct from mere laughter induced by the fact that others are laughing. 
Neil Hamburger uses the fact that the comedy club context licenses boundary-pushing 
to try something unique. After setting himself up as a buffoon, so that the audience can 
always laugh conservatively at him, he deliberately violates those thresholds to bring 
people closer toward his own moral vision.  
 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle suggests that those who ‘carry humour to excess 
are thought to be vulgar buffoons, striving after humour at all costs’ (Aristotle 1984: 
1780, IV.8). It was possible to enjoy unseemliness to such an extent that you became 
unseemly and thus laughable yourself. Aristotle’s Roman commentators agreed. For 
Cicero—the iconic orator and rhetorical theorist—too, mimicry of another’s unseemly 
behavior was usually laughable; when it went too far, the mimic turned himself into a 
buffoon and was unbecoming. It was better by far, in Cicero’s senatorial culture, to stay 
on the seemly side of mimicry so that your hearers would have to imagine the 
unseemliness you pointed to (Cicero 2001: 373–379). Such circumscriptions were not 
arbitrarily prescribed. They derived from the important considerations of public honour 
in Greek and Roman civilization and a persuasiveness in court that depended on being 
held in honour. However, when the very well-dressed but bedraggled figure of Neil 
Hamburger arrives on stage, coughing violently in a confused manner and spilling 
multiple glasses of vodka all over himself, his very starting point is a deliberate 
violation of this threshold of decorum. In this way, Hamburger announces himself not 
as an amused comedian in a moral community with the audience—unless of course they 
are already die-hard fans—but as a buffoon almost out of control of his own bodily 
movements. He makes himself laughable, evoking an entirely conservative reaction. To 
this extent, Hamburger the stage persona stands in a long line of classic fools or buffoon 
figures, who push the limits either to express outrage, to be critical, and sometimes even 
just to reinforce the political status quo by being deliberately unseemly. Some obvious 
examples are Shakespeare’s character Falstaff in the Henry IV plays and the fool in 
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King Lear, as well as the various incarnations of Harlequin in the Commedia dell’arte 
and Carlo Goldoni’s farce. Even though each of those famous fool figures will often 
reinforce norms by focusing critical laughter on their violation, each is also capable of 
radical deconstruction, of pushing the boundaries of decorum to such an extent that they 
risk punishment from the existing social order, and sometimes even shift the moral 
critical focus off themselves and onto other targets that emerge slowly. Hamburger 
combines different types of comic fool. He is the ridiculous self-deprecator as well as 
the facetious wag always making a joke—yet with a twist; Hamburger groans at the 
lameness of his own jokes and projects an air of having no enjoyment in their telling. 
The image of inept comedian is particularly important in the structure of Hamburger’s 
routine. This can make it incredible that he manages to be so engaging—and prompts us 
to ask how any moral community develops at all around his comic targets.  
 
I would now like to discuss in detail a particular performance by Hamburger that was 
recorded in Sydney in 2006.4 The DVD captures much of what Neil Hamburger’s 
routine regularly involves. The performance, as recorded, runs for around 47 minutes. 
The show begins slowly. A nonplussed Hamburger walks on stage in his customary 
tuxedo, drinks nestled under his right arm, and fusses over the microphone while 
coughing violently into it in a fit of catarrh. He doesn’t speak a word for over forty 
seconds. The first words—which attempt to ask how everybody is doing—are 
interrupted by his having dropped a glass. The first ‘lets get this party started’ precedes 
a self-introduction as ‘Neil Hamburger,’ and is then repeated five times, each time, 
apparently, delayed by coughing fits or having dropped another glass. In the process of 
picking them up, he spills the other drinks under his arm all over himself. The first 
‘joke,’ or even coherent sentence isn’t offered until 4:08. Hamburger is announcing 
himself as an unseemly clown, as something to be laughed at. Indeed the audience 
seems to find his bumbling very amusing. While it is inappropriate and problematic to 
make assumptions about the emotions of people in the audience merely from the sounds 
they make, it is reasonable to make meaningful distinctions between laugh-out-loud 
moments, tentative giggling, and groaning, as far as the intensity of funniness they 
suggest. When he drops a glass for the first time, the audience laughs loudly. However, 
throughout this introduction the audience reacts primarily with confused giggling. 
                                                
4 The performance was given at the old Newtown RSL club, Newtown, Sydney, Australia. A DVD was 
later released under the title Neil Hamburger: The World’s Funnyman (Hamburger 2006). In quoting 
from this performance, I will refer to the time markers from the DVD.  
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Hamburger’s very buffoonishness seems therefore to hover somewhere between the 
laughable and the lame. As a buffoon, he encourages the audience to be amused at his 
very act of attempting to ask joke questions, precisely because it is a buffoon who is 
asking.  
 
Acccordingly, Hamburger usually asks his questions very slowly, emphasizing certain 
words with unseemly potential. I will indicate his emphasis with italics. The first joke, 
for instance, runs as follows, ‘wha’d’ya call a senior citizen, who can’t refrain from 
exposing their genitalia in public?—Madonna’ (4:08). Loud laughs follow. The joke is 
obviously at Madonna’s expense, but it targets, more generally, the extravagance of 
popular performance by describing it unexpectedly in terms of something typically 
taken to be unseemly: senior citizens exposing their genitals. Of course, Hamburger’s 
own performance relies on the unseemliness of outlandish extravagance. The first joke 
initiates two things. First, it points to a consistent interest in famous and extremely 
popular celebrities and in deflating or questioning our expectation that celebrity and 
sacred are meaningful categories. Second, it inter-connects Hamburger’s own 
unseemliness with that of the celebrities his jokes attack. The presence of his own 
unseemly buffoonishness, as the jokes keep coming, is an important part of his being 
able to make people laugh at their telling, as I hope to show. Leo Benedictus suggests 
that ‘for most comedians, the path of so-bad-it’s-good is a dead end … not Neil 
Hamburger’ (Benedictus 2012: para. 1). There is a continual interplay between the 
unseemliness of his character on stage, as it seeks to evoke laughter and sympathy, and 
that of the people and behaviors ridiculed in his jokes.  
 
The jokes come approximately every 30 to 40 seconds, and are often about the same 
person so that an attack builds around a single celebrity and their particular fault. Often 
these groups of jokes have a degenerating pattern, starting from humorous unseemliness 
violating a typical moral norm and progressing toward the viscerally distasteful, which 
can be less obviously funny than earlier jokes to the extent that they are focused on a 
less obvious form of unseemliness or else something pushing the audience beyond the 
thresholds between the unseemly/disturbing and decorum/indecorum. For example, 
Hamburger follows up his first joke about Madonna with the following: ‘why did 
Madonna feed her infant baby, dog food?—well she had no choice, that’s just what 
came out of her breasts!’ (4:31).  
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Most of the jokes are structured around a relatively obvious unseemliness that violates a 
relatively common norm. Of the following two examples, the first has more potential 
for offence but both derive from obvious moral norms. Between 6:40 and 11:39 
Hamburger gives his audience five Michael Jackson jokes in a row that draw on the 
potential of the topic of pedophilia to hover between being experienced as something 
merely unseemly and as a moral outrage. One, for example, is the following. ‘wha’d’ya 
call five fingers that are grasping a small boy’s penis? —the Jackson five!’ (6:40). The 
topic is pedophilia but the punning word play maintains distance by displacing moral 
disgust with unseemly surprise. Another joke, however, elicits more groans: ‘Why did 
Michael Jackson put chocolate sauce on his hotdog?—well, so that his children would 
eat it!’ (9:00). Since pedophilia is a serious moral issue, the joke can remain on the 
unseemly (and thus laughable) side of the subjective threshold only if Hamburger can 
maintain sufficient distance from that seriousness by linking the joke with such an easy 
target as Michael Jackson. If anyone in the audience knew Michael Jackson, or had 
children affected in such a way, we might imagine that the comic distance would be 
disabled by default and the threshold immediately crossed. A second example of an 
obvious moral norm is at 11:39, where Hamburger asks, ‘why did al-Qaida burn in 
Kabul 10,000 copies of Pink Floyd’s The Dark Side of the Moon album?—well, because 
it’s a terrible album.’ There’s a surprise element here but the joke is structured around 
an implicit critique of the typical unseemliness (from a US point of view) of al-Qaida’s 
willingness to attack anything Western, even something so seemingly innocuous as a 
record, as well as a critique of the craziness of popular status. The first of those forms of 
unseemliness—al-Qaida’s anti-Americanism—is obviously not a difficult sentiment to 
share with a western audience. The joke relies on completely normative western values, 
because, from that point of view, the idea that a symbol of western culture is something 
to be threatened by seems absurd.  
 
Most of the jokes that push the boundaries have a certain level of normative 
unseemliness too. Those between 13:40 and 20:00 on Courtney Love target the 
unseemliness of her heroin addiction and trash aesthetic. Those about Paris Hilton at 
5:15 and 25:10 attack the supposed absurdity of scripted self-exposure through sex-tape 
‘scandals.’ Those involving Ronald MacDonald, KFC, and Dominos Pizza revolve 
around the idea that fast food is somehow dehumanizing. None of those things are 
inherently unseemly. They are made so by normative cultural beliefs, which are 
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common enough to be basis of jokes that people will find funny. Again, distance, is 
particularly important. The jokes about addiction, pedophilia, domestic violence, for 
example, keep their distance from painful realities by being connected, mostly at least, 
with cartoonish celebrities.  
 
But Neil Hamburger’s routine pushes well beyond predictable critiques of unseemliness 
defined around normative moral beliefs. That is perhaps why his act stands on a knife-
edge between laughter on the one side, and groaning and potential offence on the other. 
At least three of his jokes surely had the potential to take at least some members of the 
audience to the brink of this threshold, given the evidence of written reviews from other 
performances that I have cited. For example, ‘why did Sir Mick Jagger urinate on his 
own daughter?—he mistook her for a fan!’ (21:15). Or, ‘why did God send Terri 
Schiavo to hell?—for the sin of sloth!’ (23:39). Or again, ‘why did Kevin Federline 
spray disinfectant on Brittany Spears’s caesarian section wound?—well so it would be 
safe for fucking!’ (38:33). Given the demonstrable admixture of groans and slow 
guffaws, such jokes surely had the potential to challenge some in the audience as to 
whether they should be laughing at them at all. Hamburger is stepping across the 
subjective and social thresholds here, encouraging the audience to laugh dissonantly, as 
if from that less amusing side. Hamburger’s own groans immediately after making such 
jokes, as much as they construct his own lameness, suggest his own sympathy with the 
difficulty of finding the jokes amusing. How is it, then, that such questions and 
answers—on topics related to extreme dehumanization, or, in case of Schiavo, an 
intensely irreverent caricature of the sacred and an extreme insensitivity to a real human 
tragedy—can be entertained as jokes simply because it is Neil Hamburger who said 
them? Where does the distance come from? 
 
For one thing, Neil Hamburger’s character invites amused loathing by being pathetic 
and thus highly unseemly, which shapes his audience’s view of the jokes. For the 
character to work and the ‘jokes’ to be recognized as jokes—by being unseemly jokes 
not normal jokes, and thus laughably linked to Hamburger’s own character—he must 
continually maintain his own character as disgusting buffoon to promote amusement 
and pity that stops short of outright anger. His character is a pathetic washed up old 
comedian who cannot even do his job without the comfort of multiple glasses of vodka 
under his arm and without whining in self-hatred at the lameness of his own gags. Part 
Derrin                 Humour and the Unacceptable 
 
PORTAL, vol. 11, no. 2, July 2014.  13 
of what makes the horrible ‘jokes’ about dehumanization and the brutal insensitivity to 
a human tragedy like Schiavo’s possible as jokes, and even quite amusing, is that there 
is a fittingness to their having coming from the mouth of this buffoonish character. 
Imagine how much different—and possibly non-existent—the humour would be if such 
jokes had been told by Jerry Seinfeld, since Seinfeld cannot rely on being a buffoon in 
order to maintain distance. From that point of view, the jokes are absorbed into the 
character of Neil Hamburger. Laughing at them partly means laughing at him – so that 
the amusement (and its critical focus) is not just directed at Terri Schiavo or the 
unreasonable complacency of Hamburger’s God but at the fact that a comedian had the 
audacity and self-disregard to get up on stage and say them.  
 
Of course, not everyone can respond to the character that way. If an audience cannot 
appreciate the unseemliness of Neil Hamburger as a slightly loveable but mostly 
pathetic buffoon, then the ‘jokes’ can seem stiff and pointless too. David Whitehouse 
describes a performance of Hamburger’s at the Hammersmith Apollo during a tour of 
the UK by the band Tenacious D, in which he performed first as a support act. The 
audience of Tenacious D fans, ‘a confused cauldron of hormonal soup,’ is not happy. 
Two minutes into the set,  
 
the place rings with booing and the dull thud of coins hitting the curtain behind Neil’s 
head. “D! D! D! D!” they scream in the hope that it might speed up the arrival of the band. 
Neil loses his temper. “Jack Black has given me his personal permission to tell another 
four jokes every time you shout ‘D!,’ you pointless cocksuckers,” he rants. The crowd go 
silent. (Whitehouse 2007: para. 1, 14–15) 
 
Of the coins, Whitehouse reports Neil Hamburger’s comments when the latter turns up 
at his house: ‘“These,” Neil explains, “are what the people of Britain have thrown at me 
so far”. He’s been averaging £20 a night (which in shrapnel isn’t bad going)’ (2007: 
para. 9). The unappreciative audiences saw neither Hamburger nor his jokes as 
unseemly and therefore funny, only as pathetic and stupid. The threshold was crossed 
for a different reason. When an audience member becomes frustrated at Hamburger and 
his jokes because they fail to see him as a buffoon who is ‘in on the joke,’ and take him 
rather as just an incomprehensible abomination, it can be even funnier for the audience 
members who do understand. The very unseemliness of the inability to ‘get it,’ 
especially in the comedy club performances where the occasion encourages humour, 
explains to a large degree why that is so. 
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The barely amused loathing of Hamburger and his jokes is an entirely conservative 
reaction on the part of those who do not quite ‘get it’ and yet, aside from merely 
evoking disgust, Hamburger can evoke pity and sympathy too. This means trying to 
laugh with him from the other side of the threshold, rather than simply laughing at him. 
By the end of the recorded performance in Sydney I have been discussing Hamburger 
begins attacking the audience affectionately, which suggests that he thinks he has now 
developed some crowd sympathy. At 15:44 he refers to the audience as ‘assholes,’ and 
again at 17:14. The amused laughs of pleasure may mean anything from drunken 
oblivion to laughter at the buffoon-comedian who ‘abuses’ his audience to a more 
sympathetic recognition of the unseemliness of feeling like a despised ugly buffoon and 
a sympathetic recognition of the discomfort of laughing at ‘sick’ jokes. At 40:07 he asks 
‘how many here are on cocaine, you sick creeps?’ At 41:23, he asks the crowd to ‘give 
yourselves a round of applause you sick narcissistic creeps.’ At 43:07 they are ‘sick 
perverts.’ Hamburger is trying to make them enter his world. 
 
The attempt to create a more sympathetic laughter across the show is important because 
it is part of the emergence of Hamburger’s politics—a less visible moral vision evoking 
the emptiness of categories like celebrity and sacred. But how exactly does he create 
mutual sympathy with the lameness of his character? For one thing, he constantly links 
the lame ineptness of his character and setting with things that have the potential to be 
pitiable. For example, as he mentions his attempted suicide by jumping off a pile of bad 
reviews for his latest album, he mentions also that he is offering them for sale in a 
‘mildewy corner’ even though they won’t sell (37:15–45). He also constantly whimpers 
in a high pitched whiney sounding voice after most of his jokes, both signaling his 
feelings about a tired pitiful career and constructing common we-are-not-amused 
ground with an audience that may have struggled to find a given joke amusing or only 
could because it is unseemly and funny when a comedian himself or herself is not even 
amused. Hamburger also offers his trademark phrase ‘but that’s my life!’ multiple times 
in this performance, though mostly in a trailing-off fashion suggesting he can barely 
even bring himself to complain. How much more unseemly is a comedian who is visibly 
troubled by his own act? This comic’s sympathy with the audience and the sympathy he 
asks in return is poignantly captured in a hilarious recognition (and construction) of 
mutual perversion towards the end of the show. Hamburger wishes to thank the crowd 
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for being such a good (sympathetic?) audience just before he finishes things off: that is, 
‘before we release the cyanide gas into the room’ (41:05).  
 
Hamburger’s performance is structured as follows. There is a movement from jokes that 
attack merely conventional forms of unseemliness, via sick jokes and the ugly stage 
persona, culminating—not always, because that will depend on the audience—in the 
emergence of Hamburger’s own sense of the unseemly, his own politics. Some of the 
jokes are harder to laugh at than others because they push toward that which is painful 
or viscerally disgusting. While such jokes can simply intensify the unseemliness of the 
character there is more going on than that.  
 
Those who begin to inhabit the comic mind of Neil Hamburger on the other side of the 
social threshold, even a little, will have to maintain some subjective distance of their 
own from anything too threatening or painful, but even then, they are being asked to 
think about why the awkward jokes can stop amusement in its tracks. Why indeed are 
they still funny, if they are? Sympathizing with Hamburger means getting close to that 
uncomfortable threshold. It means dissolving the distance. Hamburger achieves this 
with jokes that can truly push the limit in contrast to his earlier jokes that might have 
been easier to find amusing. The implicit question that movement evokes is what the 
conditions are by which disgusting food, and the horrors drug addiction, murder, and 
dehumanization were kept at a comic distance before. When the distance dissolves and 
the threshold is reached, a fresh moral vision and thus a fresh sense of what is unseemly 
is exposed to view. To put it another way, Hamburger’s underlying skepticism about the 
emptiness of the categories of celebrity and sacred emerges the more the audience is 
alienated from obvious forms of amusing unseemliness, pushed toward confusion, and 
made to ask the question of whether it is still possible to laugh. When an obvious 
unseemliness borders on the painful in a context that is supposed to be funny, the very 
difficulty of finding it funny begs the question of whether there is another unseemly 
target being aimed at. For example, comic distance is wound into the caricature of a 
God who could flippantly punish people with things like Domino’s Pizza. Yet, when 
that caricature of God, and its comic distance from anything people might really believe 
in, is suddenly repositioned in the context of the poignant human tragedy of Terri 
Schiavo, the distance dissolves and the amusing caricature is qualified by the suffering 
of a real person. That suffering is almost made worse by the presence of the caricature. 
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The very idea that God could be flippantly responsible for the terrible suffering Schiavo 
and her family and then flippantly send her to hell for retributive punishment is itself 
horrific. The caricature of God using Domino’s pizza for retribution was the initial 
target. Distance from the confronting idea of divine retribution comes from the 
unseemliness of ‘creating’ Domino’s pizza to punish people and from the fact that a 
scenario in which those responsible for the holocaust were brought to some justice can 
be compelling. But the joke about Schiavo goes much further. The caricature of God is 
still the comic butt. However, it borders on the offensive or painful both for those who 
believe in a better God than that and for anyone who sees this as divine injustice. In 
trying to answer why one might still be laughing at such a joke, and whether they 
should be—while everyone else in the comedy club setting is laughing and the context 
makes laughter expected—the question arises as to what other unseemliness Hamburger 
may be attacking. Why wouldn’t something else be going on when the jokes border on 
abusive non-jokes? When the sexual foibles of celebrities, such as Kevin Federline and 
Britney Spears, are suddenly made viscerally horrible by the dehumanizing idea of 
‘fucking’ a caesarian section wound, the joke can only remain funny if it is reinterpreted 
as something not now so much about sexual unseemliness (and the moral idea that 
famous and influential people ought to be good role models) but more about the 
emptiness of fame and the intensity of our desire to make it meaningful when joking 
about the foibles of famous people. Casting celebrity jokes in sick terms, and groaning 
at them himself, Hamburger takes them to the very edge of their status as jokes, making 
a mockery even of the very act of joking about celebrities.  
 
How does this work? Why is he doing it? There is a constant stream of television shows 
and magazines that mock celebrities. What is Hamburger doing that is different? Jokes 
about celebrities and jokes about God or deities tend to reinforce normative expectations. 
If we laugh at the silliness of sex-tape scandals and the drug-use of movie stars, it is, at 
one level, a reinforcement of the belief that stars and public figures ought to set a better 
example. At another level, such humour stems from the belief that celebrities ought not 
to suppose that people care about what they get up to just because they are famous. To 
laugh at what is unseemly in those instances is to say what is seemly. For Hamburger, 
however, that very seemliness is unseemly. The categories of celebrity and sacred as 
well as the moral beliefs that create expectations concerning them are utterly empty. 
Hamburger is deconstructing the many ways in which we keep these categories 
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meaningful by ordinary mockery of celebrities and gods. He makes a mockery of 
celebrity-joking both by gradually stripping celebrity jokes of their meaningfulness as a 
moral critique, recasting them as sick jokes and pushing the limits of people’s comic 
distance. He makes a mockery of God-jokes too by shifting them from a light-hearted 
moral critique of a God-caricature into attack on a God-caricature that is little short of 
evil. Hamburger’s mockery of celebrity jokes in particular is also achieved by 
embodying the emptiness of the category himself. He is a buffoon figure groaning at the 
‘failure’ of his own career as a comedian. Of course, that is exactly where Hamburger’s 
brilliance lies. The deflationary irreverence toward the very idea of celebrity and sacred 
as meaningful, when coming from an apparently bitter old comic who has never really 
been popular, is entirely, and often delightfully, in character.  
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